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WATER RESOURCES-IRECLAIMING STATE
LAMATION

POWER

OVER FEDERAL REC-

PROJECTs--California v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2985

(1978).

The U. S. Supreme Court held in California v. United States, 98 S.
Ct. 2985 (1978), that under section 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902,1 a state may impose on a permit granting water to the United
States for a federal reclamation project any conditions which are not
inconsistent with federal statutes. The six-three majority opinion,
written by Justice Rehnquist, marks a significant departure from prior
cases which haa severely limited the role of state law in federal reclamation projects. A strongly worded dissent argued that the federal
government must follow state law to a limited extent in the acquisition
of water rights for a reclamation project, but need not defer to state
law at all in the determination of the use or distributionof the water. 2
This note will examine the background, reasoning, and implications
of California v. United States, a controversy which involves the New
Melones Dam of California's Central Valley Project, and will conclude that despite the majority's gesture toward state control over reclamation water, the Court's failure to define the permissible scope of
state control may well result in California's victory being a hollow
one.
I.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Reclamation Act of 1902

The commerce, property, and general welfare clauses of the Constitution together authorize virtually complete federal control over the
I. Section 8 provides:
[N] othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in
any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions
of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in
any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the
waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.
Reclamation Act of 1902, § 8, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1976).
2. 98 S. Ct. at 3003. The dissent was written by Justice White with Justices Brennan
and Marshall concurring in the dissent.
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nation's water resources. 3 Until the early 1900's, however, federal inactivity in the field of water use and development reflected Congress'
apparent willingness to defer to control by the states over water within
4
their borders.
The Reclamation Act of 1902 was passed to encourage development of the extensive arid and semiarid lands in the western states by
providing financial assistance to states unable to undertake large-scale
irrigation projects by themselves. 5 After 1902, Congress began
gradually to expand its assertion of authority over water resources.
Today the federal government dominates in the areas of navigation,6
irrigation, production of hydroelectric power, and flood control.
Each expansion of federal activity has resulted in a displacement of
state control and a concomitant increase in the number of federal7
state conflicts over the use of this valuable resource.
B.

The Central Valley Project

The State of California undertook the Central Valley Project in the
1920's in an effort to solve some of the state's critical water problems,
including flood damage and a need for irrigation. 8 Failing in its attempts to finance the undertaking, which envisioned an ambitious network of dams and canals on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers,

3. See note 29 infra.
4. King, Federal-State Relations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U. DET.
L.J. 1, 14(1959).
5. California,98 S. Ct. at 2995.
6. King, supra.note 4, at 17.
7. Id. at 15. The long history of these conflicts has been explored by several commentators. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark ed. 1967); Attwater, State Control over Federal Reclamation Projects, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 281 (1975); Goldberg,
Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1964); Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48 CAL. L. REV. 43 (1960);

Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 49 (1964);
Towner, The Role of the State, 45 CAL. L. REV. 725 (1957); Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SuP. CT.

REV. 158; Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464 (1960);
Comment, Allocation of Waterfrom Federal Reclamation Projects: Can the States De-

cide?, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 343 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Water Allocation];
Comment, Federal Appropriation and the Reclamation Act of 1902, 57 NEB. L. REV.
403 (1978).
8. For a description and history of the Central Valley Project, see Ivanhoe Irrig.
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 280-84 (1958); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728-34 (1950). California operates a large-scale system of water
projects in addition to those undertaken by the federal government. See Comment, Water Allocation, supra note 7, at 35 1-52.
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California sought the help of the federal government.9 Congress took
over the project in 193510 and has repeatedly expanded its scope,
making the Central Valley Project the largest undertaking to date under the federal reclamation program. 1 '
C.

The New Melones Dam

The New Melones Dam, a multipurpose project on the Stanislaus
River, was authorized as a part of the Central Valley Project in
1944.12 The watershed which supplies the water involved in the project is contained entirely within California. As with all such projects,
Congress directed that it be operated in accordance with federal reclamation laws, 13 chief among which is the Reclamation Act of 1902.
The project is intended to serve the purposes of flood control, irrigation, municipal and industrial supply, hydroelectric power, recre14
ation, water quality control, and fish and wildlife preservation.
H.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

State Board's Response to FederalRequest

In accordance with its usual practice, the United States, through
the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior (the Bureau), applied to the California State Water Resources Control Board

9.
10.

Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 280 (1958).
Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 831, § 1, 49 Stat. 1028, 1038 (1935). The project was

reauthorized by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1940, in which the purposes of the project
were stated to be

improving navigation, regulating the flow of the San Joaquin River and the Sacramento River, controlling floods, providing for storage and for the delivery of the

stored waters thereof, for construction under the provisions of the Federal reclamation laws of such distribution systems as the Secretary of the Interior deems necessary .... for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands .... and other beneficial
uses ....

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1940, ch. 895, § 2, 54 Stat. 1198, 1200 (1940). Authority over

the project is given to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior. Id. The Department administers reclamation projects through the Bureau of Reclamation. California,

98 S. Ct. at 3001.
11.
12.

California,98 S. Ct. at 2989.
Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, § 10, 58 Stat. 887, 901 (1944). The New Melones

Project was modified and reauthorized by the Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1180, 1191 (1962).
13. Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1180, 1191
(1962).
14. Id. at 1191, 1192.
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(the Board) for permits to appropriate water for the New Melones
Project from the Stanislaus River.' 5 The Board determined that unappropriated water was available,' 6 but found that the Bureau had
failed to show an actual present or projected need for the water or a
specific plan for its use.' 7 In addition, the Central Valley Project had
already generated substantial quantities of water which were not being used.' 8 Because the project was expected to result in serious damage to fishing, wildlife habitat, and recreation in the area above the
dam,' 9 the Board granted the permits subject to twenty-five conditions. 20 The first major condition deferred impoundment of water for
"consumptive" purposes, including irrigation, until the Bureau could
show (a) a need for such use which outweighs the resulting environmental damage, and (b) firm commitments from water users to purchase project water for irrigation. 2 1 The second major condition
imposed by the Board disallowed, until further order of the Board,
consumptive use of project water outside the four counties of origin
making up the watershed in which the project is located. 22

15. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 880 (E.D. Cal. 1975). Four separate applications were filed: the Bureau filed two applications and in addition sought assignment of two others which had originally been filed in 1952 by the California Department of Finance. Under California law, assignment of these applications would give the
Bureau an appropriation priority senior to applications filed after 1952. Id. at 880, n.7;
CAL. WATER CODE § 1450 (West 1971).
16. New Melones Project Water Rights Decision, Cal. State Water Resources
Control Bd. Decision 1422, at 10 (April 4, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Decision 1422].
Under California law, the Board in granting an application must determine that unappropriated water is available and that the proposed use is "reasonable, beneficial and in
the public interest." Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201,
1240, 1253, 1255 (West 1971); Comment. Water Allocation, supra note 7, at 353. "'The
Board undertakes a balancing of competing demands and policy considerations and has
broad discretion .... " Decision 1422, supra at 15 (citations omitted).
17. Decision 1422, supra note 16, at 14, 17-18.
18. Id. at 14.
19. Id. at 17-18. The Board expected the dam to result in the elimination of whitewater boating and stream fishing and in the destruction of wildlife habitat. Id. An unsuccessful suit was filed by environmentalists to enjoin construction on the dam pending the Board's decision. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp.
131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Stamm, 416 U.S. 974 (1974).
20. Decision 1422, supra note 16, at 29-36.
21.
Id.at29-30.
22. Id. at 31. See note 53 infra (discussion of California county of origin statute).
Other major conditions reserved jurisdiction to the Board to impose further requirements on the Bureau to ensure that the water is beneficially used, established reporting
requirements, set deadlines for construction and application of water to the authorized
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B.

Lower Court Rulings

The United States sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California 23 for a declaratory judgment that: (1) the United
States may appropriate unappropriated water for a federal reclamation project in-California without applying to the Board for a permit,
and (2) if the United States chooses as a matter of comity to apply to
the Board, the Board must grant a permit if unappropriated water is
available and may not impose any terms or conditions in the permits
which are not specifically authorized by federal laws or regulations.
The district court held that the United States was required as a matter
of comity to apply to the state for a permit to appropriate water 24 but
that the state must grant a permit without any conditions if it determines that unappropriated water is available. 25 The court of appeals
affirmed but held that the United States was required to apply for
state permits not as a matter of comity but rather as a requirement of
section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902.26 The U. S. Supreme Court
reversed that portion of the court of appeals decision which held that
California cannot condition its allocation of water for a federal reclamation project. The Court held that states may impose any conditions
not inconsistent with congressional provisions authorizing the project. 2 7 The Court remanded the case for findings on the issue of
whether the Board's conditions were consistent with the Reclamation
Act and with the legislation authorizing the project. 28

uses, required the Bureau to install outlet pipes for release of water not authorized for
appropriation, required the Bureau to clear vegetation from the site of the reservoir,
and authorized continuing inspections to verify the Bureau's compliance. Id. at 30-36.
23.

United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975).

24. Id. at 889-90.
25. Id. at 901.
26. United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977). The court of
appeals relied primarily on the reasoning of the district court and on two recent Supreme Court decisions. In Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), the Court held that
the Clean Air Act does not subject a federal installation to state permit requirements.

The court of appeals read Hancock as imposing a "requirement of clear language to
bind the United States." 558 F.2d at 1349. The other case relied on by the court of appeals was Environmental Protection Agency v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), which
held that under the Water Pollution Control Act, "[f] ederal installations are subject to
state regulation only when and to the extent that congressional authorization is clear
and unambiguous." Id. at 211.
27.

98S. Ct. at 3001.

28. Id. at 3003. The United States argued that the Board's conditions are inconsistent with the general purposes in the project authorization act, which include irrigation,
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III.

ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING

A.

The Court's Attempt to Distinguish Contrary Precedents

Both the United States and California conceded to the district court
that Congress can preempt state law entirely in the reclamation field if
it so chooses. 29 The issue was to what extent Congress, through section 8 of the Reclamation Act, intended to preempt state law in determining how project water is to be used. 30 The Court's ruling therefore
turned on an interpretation of that portion of section 8 which states:
[N] othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the
Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act,
shall proceed in conformity with such laws ....31
The Court placed primary reliance on the Reclamation Act's legislative history3 2 and the clear language of section 8. Both appear to
support the Court's conclusion that, absent express preemption in a
project authorization act, Congress intended state law to control both
the appropriation of water and the distribution and use of water involved in federal projects. 3 3 While there was some concern in Congress in 1902 about whether a cooperative federal-state scheme was
hydroelectric power, flood control, and domestic, municipal, and industrial consumption. The purposes of the project are allegedly undermined primarily by those conditions which defer impoundment of water for irrigation, and which prohibit distribution
of water outside the four counties of origin comprising the project's watershed. The
United States anticipates that the conditions will have numerous disruptive effects on
the project, including (1)delay of the expeditious impoundment of water in the reservoir for congressionally mandated purposes, (2) delay in initiating the irrigation and
power components of the projects, and (3) adverse impact on the economic viability of
the project. The sale of hydroelectric power and water for irrigation generates revenues
which partially offset project costs. The Board's denial of water for these purposes thus
imposes an additional financial burden on the Bureau. See Brief for the United States at
57-86, California v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2985 (1978).
29. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 883, 898 (E.D. Cal. 1975). See
Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958). Federal power over
water resources is derived primarily from the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8,
cf. 3; the general welfare clause, id. cl. 1; and the proprietary power, id. art. IV, § 3, ci.
2. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 100-02 (R. Clark ed. 1967); King, FederalState Relations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U. DET. L.J. 1,3-11 (1959).
30. See Sax, supra note 7, at 51.
31. Reclamation Act of 1902, § 8, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1976).
32. See 98 S.Ct. at 2995-98.
33. For example, Representative Mondell, a prime sponsor of the bill in the House,
stated: "Every act since that of April 26, 1866, has recognized local laws and customs
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workable,3 4 the Court concluded that the Act recognized local control
over water appropriation and distribution.3 5
However, the Supreme Court in prior interpretations of the Reclamation Act had construed section 8 to require compliance with state
36
law only in the acquisition of water and not in its distribution or use.
The Court in California attempted to distinguish these cases by isolating a narrow holding in each which does not directly conffict with its
current result, and by disavowing as dicta the portions of those opinions which interpreted section 8 as barring states from exerting any
control over water use or distribution.
appertaining to the appropriation and distribution of water used in irrigation, and it has
been deemed wise to continue our policy in this regard." 35 CONG. REC. 6679 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Mondell). Representative Mondell went on to cite sections of several federal statutes, regulations of the General Land Office, statements of President Roosevelt,
and the Republican Party Platform of 1900, to the effect that distribution of water for
irrigation was a matter for state control. Id. Senator Clark stated:
[T] he question of reservoir sites and reservoir building is one that appeals to the
Government as a matter of national import, but the question of State or Territorial
control of waters after having been released from their bondage in the reservoirs
which have been provided is a separate and distinct proposition ....It is right that
the General Government should control, should conserve, and should reservoir the
headwaters of these streams. In this it is a national and not a State proposition. But
in the distribution of these waters.., it is right and proper that the various States
and Territories should control in the distribution. The conditions in each and every
State and Territory are different. What would be applicable in one locality is totally and absolutely inapplicable in another.
Id. at 2222 (remarks of Sen. Clark).
34. One Representative referred to the Act as a "lame, bungling effort to accomplish an impossible blending of the views." 35 CONG. REC. 6670 (1902) (remarks of Rep.
Robinson).
35. 98 S. Ct. at 2997-98. A contrary reading of the legislative history was reached
by the district court, 403 F. Supp. at 884-89. A helpful discussion of the ambiguities in
the Act's history is contained in Goldberg, supra note 7, at 27-31. The author's conclusion supports the district court's view:
The old argument of the United States seems to be correct: section 8 is directory,
not mandatory. This is not necessarily because the Government owns all the unappropriated water, but rather because Congress has authorized federal conduct inconsistent with state law and thereby shown that section 8 refers to state law for a
standard of compensation rather than of conduct.
Id. at 31 (footnote omitted).
36. The cases in which the Supreme Court has actually construed section 8 of the
Reclamation Act are Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963), and Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275
(1958). Three important earlier cases dealing with federal-state conflicts in the reclamation area are United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (damage to
land values as result of construction of Friant Dam in the Central Valley Project are
compensable because Congress elected to treat the dam as a reclamation project and
not as a project authorized under the commerce power; thus Reclamation Act provisions for reimbursement for state-created rights taken under eminent domain are applicable to the claims); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (granting an equitable
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In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,37 the Court found
that California law directly conflicted with section 5 of the Reclamation Act, 38 which prohibits delivery of project water to tracts of more
than 160 acres under single ownership. The Court held that the "specific and mandatory" congressional limitation overrode section 8's
general requirement of state control and thus preempted the inconsistent state law. 39 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Ivanhoe
Court said:
As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with
state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation
project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested
interests therein .... We read nothing in § 8 that compels the United
40
States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State.
The California Court found that because Ivanhoe presented a direct
conflict between a state law and a specific provision of the Reclamation Act, the above language was unnecessarily broad. 41 However, the
Ivanhoe language was referred to in two Supreme Court cases construing section 8, City of Fresno v. California42 and Arizona v. California,43 and was given precedential weight both by the Supreme

apportionment of the water of the North Platte River and rejecting as unnecessary a determination of the United States' claim to ownership of all unappropriated water);
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 (1935) (the Secretary of the Interior's rights as an
appropriator in Wyoming for projects under the Reclamation Act are subject to Wyoming laws; thus in a suit to determine the rights of Nebraska and Wyoming in the waters
of the North Platte River the Secretary will be bound by an adjudication of the rights of
Wyoming, and is not an indispensable party).
37. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
38. Reclamation Act of 1902, § 5, 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
39. 357 U.S. at 291-92.
40. Id.
41. 98 S. Ct. at 3000. The dissenters were troubled by the majority's attempt to save
the actual holding in Ivanhoe while rejecting the reasoning on which the holding was
based:
It is plain enough that in response to the argument that § 8 subjected the § 5 contract provisions to the strictures of state law, the [Ivanhoe] Court squarely rejected
the submission on the ground that § 8 dealt only with the acquisition of water rights
and required the United States to respect the water rights that were vested under
state law. That the Court might have saved the § 5 provision on a different and narrower ground more acceptable to the present Court majority does not render the
ground actually employed any less of a holding of the Court or transform it into the
discardable dictum the majority considers it to be.
Id. at 3009 (White, J., dissenting).
42. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
43. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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Court in those cases 44 and by the district court in California v. United
States.45 The Ivanhoe language, including a statement which the California Court omitted from its quotation, 46 had given rise to a traditional distinction between the acquisitionof water for federal projects,
over which state law exerted some influence, and the distribution of
water from those projects, in which state participation was wholly excluded. 47 That distinction was the major premise of the dissenters' argument in California.48 The majority resolved the "tension" between
the often quoted Ivanhoe statements and its current holding by dis-

44. The FresnoCourt stated:
Petitioner seems to say that § 8 of the Reclamation Act ... requires compliance
with California statutes relating to preferential rights of counties and watersheds of
origin and to the priority of domestic over irrigation uses. However, § 8 does not
mean that state law may operate to prevent the United States from exercising the

power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others. This was settled in
Ivanhoe .... Rather, the effect of § 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made.
372 U.S. at 629-30. In Arizona the Court said:
The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires the United States in the
delivery of water to follow priorities laid down by state law has already been disposed of by this Court in Ivanhoe ... and reaffirmed in City of Fresno .... In Ivanhoe we held that, even though § 8 of the Reclamation Act preserved state law, that
general provision could not override a specific provision of the same Act .... We
said:
"As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with state law
when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes
necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein.... We read
nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions
imposed by the State."...
Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act did not subject the Secretary to state law in disposing of water in that case, we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the
Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the [Boulder
Canyon] Project Act.
373 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted).
45. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 891-93 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
46. "But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of
federal projects." Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 291. See 98 S. Ct. at 3000.
47. State "influence" over acquisition extended primarily to the definition of vested
rights for which compensation must be made in the exercise of federal eminent domain
power. See note 36 supra. The distinction between acquisition and distribution is not
supported by the language of section 8, and is particularly unhelpful when a state prohibits the impoundment of water for a particular purpose, as California has done. In such
a case, conditions on the acquisition of water are clearly aimed at control of the eventual distribution.
48. 98 S. Ct. at 3009 (White, J., dissenting). The distinction apparently was discarded by the majority. 98 S. Ct. at 2997-98 n.21.
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missing them as dicta, both in Ivanhoe and where they later surfaced
50
in Fresno49 and in Arizona.
In both Fresno and Arizona, provisions of the congressional act
which authorized the project in question were held to override state
laws which would have required a distribution of project water different from that contemplated by Congress and the Bureau. Moreover,
both opinions appear to have assumed that any state priorities or control over water distribution would be inconsistent with federal law, 5 '

49. Id. at 3000. In Fresno, the Court faced a conflict between the federal law authorizing the Friant Dam Project and California's water code. The federal statute
prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from making contracts for municipal water use
unless the Secretary found that the "efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes"
would not be impaired. 372 U.S. at 630 (quoting Reclamation Project Act of 1939, §
9(c), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976)). The city asserted that section 8 gave precedence to
California statutes granting priority to municipal and domestic use over irrigation. In
holding that the specific congressional provision prevailed, the Court's decision in
Fresno is arguably consistent with both Ivanhoe and the CaliforniaCourt's holding. In
rejecting the city's claim that the state priorities prevented the exercise of federal eminent domain power, the Fresno Court had said that "the effect of § 8 in such a case is to
leave to state law the definition of property interests, if any, for which compensation
must be made." Id. The CaliforniaCourt "disavow [ed] this dictum.., to the extent that
it implies that state law does not control even where not inconsistent with such expressions of congressional intent." 98 S. Ct. at 2999 n.24.
50. 98 S. Ct. at 3000-01. Arizona involved a dispute between the United States and
the states of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah over the apportionment of water of the Colorado River and its tributaries. The Boulder Canyon Project
Act contained language very similar to that of section 8, and it was contended that the
project act thus gave states control over use of the project water. The Court concluded
that the specific provision in the project act which gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to contract for water delivery impliedly gave the Secretary power to choose
among water users without regard to state law. This conclusion followed from the
Court's view that the contracting power was a necessary means of carrying out a congressional scheme in the project act for apportionment of the river. Id. at 579-81, 588.
The Court relied on Ivanhoe for the proposition that section 8, or a similar provision,
does not permit state law to regulate the disposition of water. See note 44 supra (quotation from Arizona). The CaliforniaCourt stated that because there was no need in Arizona to define the scope of section 8 "except as it related to the singular legislative
history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act," the broader use of the Ivanhoe language
was dictum. 98 S. Ct. at 3000-01. A thorough analysis of the protracted Arizona litigation is contained in Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to
People, States, and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 158.
51. The dissent in California took the view that the Ivanhoe interpretation of section 8 was necessary to the Arizona Court's result. The dissent pointed out that "[t] he
particular terms of the Secretary's contracts [in Arizona] were not authorized or directed by any federal statute. The Court's holding that he was free to proceed as he did
was squarely premised on the proposition that § 8 did not control the distribution of the
project water." 98 S. Ct. at 3010 (White, J., dissenting). If this analysis of the reasoning
in Arizona is correct, Arizona and Californiacannot stand together, and the California
Court would have been more forthright by expressly overruling Arizona.
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and to that extent they were expressly disavowed by the California
52
Court.
B.

FederalEminent Domain Power Under the Reclamation Act:
The Import of Footnote 21

The issue of the scope of federal eminent domain power under the
Reclamation Act was raised in Fresno when the plaintiff city argued

that California statutes which grant preference for water use to counties of origin operated to prevent the Bureau from diverting water beyond those counties until their needs had been satisfied. 53 The city asserted that for the federal government to condemn water rights in
those counties for diversion elsewhere would be to disregard California law and thus violate section 8. The Fresno Court rejected the
claim, stating that "§ 8 does not mean that state law may operate to
prevent the United States from exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others."5 4

52. 98 S. Ct. at 3000-01. The Court also quoted from two decisions in a water rights
controversy between Nebraska and Wyoming, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40
(1935) and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), to support its conclusion that
states may impose conditions not inconsistent with federal laws. 98 S. Ct. at 3001-02.
In the 1935 case, however, no conflicting state law or condition was in issue. In holding
that the United States was not a necessary party to an apportionment of water between
Nebraska and Wyoming, the Court said,
The bill alleges, and we know as a matter of law [citing section 8], that the Secretary-.., must obtain permits and priorities for the use of water from the State of
Wyoming in the same manner as a private appropriator or an irrigation district
formed under the state law. His rights can rise no higher than those of Wyoming,
and an adjudication of the defendant's [Wyoming's] rights will necessarily bind
him. Wyoming will stand in judgment for him as for any other appropriator in that
state. He is not a necessary party.
295 U.S. at 43. Because the meaning of the language of section 8 was not in issue in that
case, the opinion offers scant support for the CaliforniaCourt's conclusion.
The second Nebraska decision offers clear support only for the proposition that the
United States must comply with state laws and permit requirements for the appropriation of water. See 325 U.S. at 613-16. The United States there based its argument on the
theory that it owned all the unappropriated water, id. at 611, a theory which was rejected
by the Court and which has since been discredited. For a discussion of ownership theories advanced by both the states and the federal government, see Goldberg, supra note 7;
Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638
(1957).
53. 372 U.S. at 628. The California county of origin statute prohibits the release or
assignment of any appropriated water which "will, in the judgment of the board, deprive
the county in which the water ...originates of any such water necessary for the development of the county." CAL. WATER CODE § 10505 (West 1971).

54.

372U.S. at 630.
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Although the issue was neither briefed nor argued before it, the
California Court, in dictum in footnote 21, rejected the Fresno interpretation of section 8's impact on federal eminent domain power. 5 5
After citing Ivanhoe and Fresno for the rule that "state water law does
not control in the distribution of reclamation water if inconsistent
with other congressional directives to the Secretary [of the Interior] ,"56 the Court went on in footnote 21 to state:
Whatever the intent of Congress with respect to state control over the
distribution of water, however, Congress in the 1902 Act intended to
follow state law as to appropriation of water and condemnation of water rights. Under the 1902 Act, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized in his discretion to "locate and construct" reclamation
projects. As the legislative history of the 1902 Act convincingly demonstrates, however, if state law did not allow for the appropriation
or condemnation of the necessary water, Congress did not intend the
Secretary of the Interior to initiate the project. Subsequent legislation

authorizing a specific project may by its terms signify congressional
intent that the Secretary condemn or be permitted to appropriate the
necessary water rights for the project in question, but no such legislation was considered by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case.
That court will be free to consider arguments by the Government to
this effect on remandY
This unusually broad language contradicts the Court's prior opinions
in Fresno58 and its predecessor, Dugan v. Rank 59 in which the express
grant of authority to the Secretary to condemn water rights needed for

55. 98S.Ct.at2997-98 n.21.
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. 372 U.S. at 630. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.The footnote 21 language referring to "state law [which does] not allow.., for condemnation" is a sloppy
formulation of the Fresno issue, that is whether state priorities for distribution can operate to restrict the exercise of federal eminent domain power by virtue of section 8. No
presently definable water right vests in any individual by virtue of California's county
of origin statutes; rather a "priority as against the state is reserved to a class composed

of the inhabitants and property owners within a protected area." Note, State Water
Development: Legal Aspects of California'sFeather River Project, 12 STAN. L. REV.

439, 453 (1960). However, when an appropriation is made by a water user, and the appropriation is perfected by applying the water to a beneficial use, the appropriation can
be condemned by the state. CAL. WATER CODE § 11575 (West 1971); Note, supra at
453 -54.
59. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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reclamation projects in section 7 of the Reclamation Act 60 was held to
override the operation of state law under section 8.61
If the Court's statement in footnote 21 is taken literally, the effect
would be to allow states to define the types of property rights which
the federal government may condemn for a project. The language also
suggests that a state may decide as a policy matter whether or not
available water should be used for the federal project at all--effec-

tively giving the state power to reject the project in its entirety. This
reading would be difficult to reconcile with the rest of the opinion
since the exercise of such a power by the state appears "inconsistent"
with Reclamation Act provisions which direct the Secretary to construct projects authorized by Congress, and empower the Secretary to
condemn "any rights or property" when necessary for the projects'

completion.

62

The dissent argued that the majority's conclusion would "permit a
State to disentitle the Government to acquire the property necessary
or appropriate to carry out an otherwise constitutionally permissible

60. Section 7 provides:
Where in carrying out the provisions of this Act it becomes necessary to acquire
any rights or property, the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to acquire
the same for the United States by purchase or by condemnation under judicial process, and to pay from the reclamation fund the sums which may be needed for that
purpose ....

Reclamation Act of 1902, § 7, 43 U.S.C § 421 (1976). The Attorney General is directed
to institute suit at the request of the Secretary. Id. Similar language is contained in the
Central Valley Project authorization, empowering the Secretary to acquire "by proceedings in eminent domain, or otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and
other property necessary for said purposes." Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, ch. 832, §
2, 50 Stat. 844, 850 (1937).
61. The City of Fresno intervened in Dugan, a suit brought against the United
States by claimants to water rights along the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam. The
city sought declaratory relief as to its statutory priorities in addition to the injunctive relief sought by the other plaintiffs; those claims were decided in City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963). The Dugan Court upheld a court of appeals finding that "the
United States was authorized to acquire, either by physical seizure or otherwise, such of
the rights of the claimants as it needed to operate the Project and that this power could
not be restricted by state law." 372 U.S. at 617. The Court concluded that
[t]
he power to seize which was granted here had no limitation placed upon it by the
Congress, nor did the Court of Appeals bottom its conclusion on a finding of any
limitation. [The federal officers have] plenary power to seize the whole of respondents' rights in carrying out the congressional mandate ....
Id. at 622-23.
62. See note 60 supra.
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and statutorily authorized undertaking." 63 A somewhat narrower
reading of footnote 21 is that the Bureau must find its authority to
condemn water rights for a project in the provisions of that specific
project's authorization act and not under the more general mandates
of the Reclamation Act. However, by relegating this crucially important issue to a footnote and dispensing with further elaboration, the
Court has raised and left unresolved the question of the extent of state
power over appropriation and condemnation.
In summary, the change most clearly wrought by the Court's holding is to allow states, for the first time, to impose any conditions on
permits granted to the United States which are not inconsistent with
congressional directives to the Secretary. 64 Conditions which conform
to this standard apparently may be imposed on either the acquisition
or distribution of project water. The holding expressly rejects the
long-standing assumption that a state may impose no conditions regardless of the presence or absence of conflict between those condi65
tions and federal laws.

The opinion correctly assesses the legislative history of the Reclamation Act as evidencing Congress' intent to allow room for the
operation of state law in the federal reclamation program. But in
dealing with prior opinions on the scope of state control, the Court
has attempted with varying degrees of success to retain the holdings
while rejecting the reasoning on which the holdings were based. Also,
apparently because the issue of whether a state law is inconsistent
with a federal law depends in large part on the peculiar features and
background of the federal statute in question, the Court has carefully
avoided suggesting any guidelines or considerations to be used in
63. 98 S. Ct. at 3011 (White, J., dissenting).
64. In attempting to reconcile the Board's conditions with the Court's prior cases,
California had emphasized in its brief that the Board had only deferred, rather than denied, the grant of water to the Bureau, and that in this case the state was not seeking to
control the use of project water. Brief for Petitioners at 62, California v. United States,
98 S. Ct. 2985 (1978). This position is undermined by the nature and extent of the conditions imposed by the Board, but the Court's holding does not turn on such distinctions.
65. The district court took an unusual approach in framing the issue as one ofjurisdiction:
It appears to this court, however, that the question of the effect of Decision 1422 on
the purposes of the New Melones Project is simply not material to the disposition
of this case. As this opinion has previously noted, the "jurisdiction" of the Board in
regard to the construction and operation of federal reclamation projects-once
those projects have been approved-extends only so far as the determination of the
availability of unappropriated water. Beyond that point, the Board has no jurisdiction. Therefore, any conditions or terms imposed by the Board must be considered
ultra vires and "in conflict" with the purposes of the federal reclamation project.
403 F. Supp. at 901 (emphasis in original).
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making such a finding. Finally, the Court in footnote 21 has added to
the existing confusion which surrounds state power over appropriation and condemnation. This action is particularly unfortunate since
the issue has major ramifications for the balance of state and federal
power over water.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOLDING

Because the lower courts rejected as impermissible all state conditions, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a ruling on the issue
of whether the conditions imposed by the California Board are inconsistent with federal law. 66 The Court has provided only the standard
of allowing state conditions where "not inconsistent" 67 or "not directly inconsistent" 68 with congressional directives.
The lower court on remand will face only the issue whether the
Board's conditions conflict with the Reclamation Act and the federal
statutes authorizing the New Melones Project. But the outcome will
have an impact on many federal water projects in the western states
for essentially three reasons. First, the provisions of the Reclamation
Act apply to all federal reclamation projects. Second, federal statutes
which authorize specific projects are often similar in administrative
provisions and in placing a high priority on those water uses which
promote economic development and growth, especially irrigation and
power. Third, the conditions imposed by California are likely to reflect concerns shared by many western states in attempting to strike a
balance between the competing goals of development and environmental protection. Because of this commonality, the validity of the
Board's conditions will be a crucial indicator of the scope of state
power over reclamation water after California.This section will therefore examine the approaches which a court is likely to use in ruling on
the consistency issue.
The first logical source of guidance would seem to be prior cases in
which such a conflict was presented. The Court's reluctance to overrule Ivanhoe and Fresno indicates that federal laws will control in
analogous situations. But those cases may be of little use in resolving
the instant litigation: the reasoning on which those opinions were
based has been largely rejected by the California Court, leaving only
the narrow holdings that explicit and mandatory provisions in a fed66.

98 S. Ct. at 3003.

67.

Jd.at3001.

68.

Jd. at 3002.
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eral statute will override contrary state laws.6 9 Because in the instant
case the conflict between state and federal law is less clearly presented, the Ivanhoe and Fresno opinions will offer no assistance. In
the absence of such guidance, it is probable that courts will rely on
70
general preemption principles for analysis of whether conflicts exist.
Application of the rule that, under the supremacy clause, a federal
law is supreme over a conflicting state law is inevitably a matter of
statutory construction. The meaning and scope of the federal statute
must be ascertained before the nature of the conflict between the state
and federal laws can be evaluated. As a result, few general standards
are available to assist in this determination. Clearly, federal law supersedes state regulation where it is impossible to comply with the requirements of both. 7 1 But a conflict may also be found where the effect of a state law is to frustrate the purposes and objectives of the
federal act.72 One commentator has concluded that, "[g] enerally
speaking, the Court will now sanction state regulations that supple-

69. See notes 38-39 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
70. The CaliforniaCourt's decision is consistent with a modern trend toward finding that the existence of a federal regulatory scheme in an area is not alone sufficient to
show congressional intent to preempt the exercise of state regulatory power entirely. In
many early cases the Supreme Court had held that Congress, merely by regulating in an
area, had shown an intent to "occupy the field" to the exclusion of all state regulation.
See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (Congress, in empowering the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe safety regulations for
locomotives, intended to "occupy the field"; additional state-imposed requirements
were therefore invalid although the ICC had made no conflicting regulations).
The more recent trend is to reconcile the operation of the state and federal regulations if possible. In a 1973 decision, the Court stated that "conflicting law, absent
repealing or exclusivity provisions, should be pre-empted . . . 'only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of' [the federal statute]." Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973) (quoting Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963)). " [T] he proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding [state
regulation] completely ousted.'" Id. (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373
U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). Accord, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("federal regulation ... should not be deemed preemptive of state
regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably
so ordained"); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
71. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (U.S. savings bonds held in coownership pass on the death of one coowner to the survivor under Federal Treasury regulations, despite conflicting provisions of Texas community property law).
72. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627 (1973)
(municipal restrictions on jet takeoffs from a city airport found to conflict with Federal
Aeronautics Act objectives of "safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of... airspace" by increasing congestion and limiting the FAA's flexibility in controlling air
traffic).
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ment federal efforts so long as compliance with the letter or effectuation of the purpose of the federal enactment is not likely to be signifi'73
cantly impeded by the state law."
Applying these general rules to California first requires recognition
that the primary goal of the Reclamation Act and of subsequent
legislation authorizing specific projects is irrigation, although the projects frequently include other components such as flood control and
production of hydroelectric power. The sale by the Bureau of project
water for irrigation returns a portion of the project cost to the federal
government.7 4 Thus, any state conditions mandating priorities for water use other than irrigation would probably impair both the avowed
federal goal for the project and the economic feasibility of the under75
taking.
At first glance, the California Board's order deferring impoundment of water for irrigation until a need has been shown7 6 appears to
be defensible as a reasonable condition not disruptive of the project
goal, because Congress presumably did not intend to finance wasteful
or unneeded projects. But under the condition imposed, "need" will
be defined by the Board, and a "need" for irrigation will be recognized only on a showing that the benefits will outweigh environmental
damage to the watershed above the dam. 77 The condition would thus
allow the state to postpone indefinitely the achievement of federal objectives78 by asserting its own policies favoring environmental protection over irrigation.
Similarly, the Board condition disallowing consumptive use of

73.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-24 at 379 (1978). A representa-

tive phrasing of the standard is that a state law is superseded where it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
74. See note 28 supra.
75. One observer has concluded:
If congressional authorization requires that the New Melones Dam be built as
planned, then [Decision] 1422 cannot be enforced without destroying the economic feasibility of the project. There is no way that the irrigation and power purposes of New Melones can be achieved if the conditions of [Decision] 1422 remain
unchanged.
Comment, Water Allocation, supra note 7, at 373.
76. Decision 1422, supra note 16, at 30.
77. Id.
78. The 1962 New Melones project authorization provides "that the projects authorized herein shall be initiated as expeditiously and prosecuted as vigorously as may be
consistent with budgetary requirements." Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1180 (1962).
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project water outside the four counties of origin7 9 may be invalidated
not because the project act mandates a different distribution but because the Board has asserted the authority to decide how much water
is needed for those counties and whether it is beneficially used. A similar preference for the basin area is contained in the project act, but
the power to determine the water needs of that area is expressly given
to the Secretary. 80 In addition, the condition can be seen as materially
impairing the flexibility of the Secretary's exercise of his broad discre81
tion to contract for the sale of project water.
Thus, although the Court's decision is an invitation to states to impose conditions not inconsistent with federal laws, it is probable that
California's two major conditions go too far. Even the tantalizing language of the Court's footnote 2182 offers little encouragement to
states in fashioning regulations that will be upheld in the face of the
federal statutes.
The conditions imposed by California attempt to further policies of
environmental protection and water distribution which many of the
western states subject to the reclamation laws are likely to share.
Thus, the fate of the Board's order on remand will be of immense importance as an indication of how much state control will now be allowed. At the least, the Californiadecision means that states may now
participate in making reclamation policy to an extent which is not disruptive of the Bureau's preoccupation with irrigation. At the most, the
Court's footnote 21 will be read to give states life-or-death power over
congressionally authorized projects. The permissible reach of state
79. Condition 4 of Decision 1422 states:
Permits issued pursuant to Applications 14858 and 19304 shall authorize the use
of water for consumptive purposes only in the counties of Stanislaus, Calaveras,
Tuolumne and San Joaquin. A petition to amend the permits to include other specific areas will be considered by the Board upon a showing that water from other
[Central Valley Project] sources is not available to serve such areas. Any use of
water for consumptive purposes outside [those counties] that may be authorized
later shall be subordinate to beneficial use within said counties and shall terminate
when contracts are executed and the water is needed for beneficial use within said
counties.
Decision 1422, supra note 16, at 3 1.
80. The Flood Control Act of 1962 provides:
[B] efore initiating any diversions of water from the Stanislaus River Basin in connection with the operation of the Central Valley Project, the Secretary of the Interior shall determine the quantity of water required to satisfy all existing and anticipated future needs within that basin and the diversions shall at all times be
subordinate to the quantities so determined ....
Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1191 (1962).
81. See Reclamation Act of 1902, § 4, 43 U.S.C. § 419 (1976).
82. 98 S. Ct. at 2998 n.21; see notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra.
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control will probably lie somewhere between these two extremes and
will have to be defined on a case-by-case basis which will increase
rather than reduce the conflicts between state and federal governments over control of water resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite its reluctance to overrule prior cases expressly, the Court in
California v. United States abandoned the rule that state conditions
on water appropriation and distribution are inconsistent per se with
federal policy. Having at last found room for state control in the reclamation field, the Court has left the contours of that control almost
wholly undefined. If this "victory" for state control is to have substance, either the courts or Congress must clearly indicate that states
may impose reasonable conditions which allow for consideration of
needs and goals other than irrigation. The legitimate environmental
concerns of the western states should be considered by Congress and
accommodated to the fullest extent possible in project authorization
acts. Absent congresssional recognition of such concerns, however,
the permissible scope of state control can be expected to be limited to
conditions which will not impair irrigation or other project purposes
or imperil the substantial federal financial investment or the interests
of the United States in pursuing an aggressive reclamation program.
Few conditions which further substantive state policies are likely to
pass this standard.
Peggy Williams
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